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SOUTH AFRICAN AIRLINE PILOTS’ PERCEPTIONS OF ADVANCED FLIGHT DECK 
AUTOMATION  
Dr. Preven Naidoo. 
Dept. of Human Resource Management 
University of Pretoria, South Africa 
 
This article reports on the construction of the Automation Attitude 
Questionnaire (AAQ), to assess airline pilots’ perceptions about operating 
advanced automated aircraft. A total of 262 airline pilots from a large 
South African carrier participated in the validation of the questionnaire. A 
five-factor measurement model was established by using exploratory 
factor analysis. The five factors associated with perceptions of advanced 
automated systems were labelled as: Comprehension, Training, Trust, 
Workload, and Design. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients and the mean 
inter-item correlation of each factor were highly satisfactory and 
confirmed the homogeneity and unidimensionality of the five-factor 
solution for the AAQ.  
 
Advancements in computer and processing technology compounded by economic demands 
have given rise to increasingly electronic flight deck design on aircraft.  During the 1980s 
there was a rapid development of automated apparatus, which were incorporated, in large 
aircraft. Significant developments included inertial reference systems (IRS), flight guidance 
systems, auto-throttle/thrust systems, data and flight management systems (FMS), and various 
crew alerting systems (Boeing EICAS and Airbus ECAM) (Risukhin, 2001; Wiener, 1989). 
In general terms, the new technology manifested itself as ‘the glass cockpit’ ‘(displays driven 
by computer graphic systems)’ (Wiener, 1988, p. 435). The integration of automation into 
commercial aircraft flight decks has contributed to greater efficiency, productivity and overall 
safety (Wiener, 1993). 
 
The introduction of automation to the modern aircraft flight deck, however, has also resulted 
in a debate ‘for’ or ‘against’ such automation (Risukhin, 2001). Wiener (1989, p.1) indicated 
that as the level of automation increased there was ‘a growing discomfort that the cockpit 
may be coming too automated.’ Human factor issues such as poor interface design, pilot 
complacency and over-reliance on automation, deteriorating flying skills and diminished 
situational awareness began to be considered (Billings, 1997; Palmer, 1995; Parasuraman, & 
Riley, 1997; Wood, 2004).  
 
The results of the survey related to airline pilots’ perceptions towards operating advanced 
automated flight deck systems is presented as a two part article series. In part one the need for 
the study and the construction of the Automation Attitude Questionnaire (AAQ) is described. 
In the second article the relationship between the airline pilots’ perceptions of flight deck 
automation and their personal characteristics and operational position are explored.   
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In the present study the researchers seek to identify the core human factor issues related to 
advanced flight deck automation and to construct a valid and reliable instrument to measure 
the perceptions of airline pilots towards operating advanced automated aircraft.  
 
Background 
 
Humans operating flying machines started only a century ago when Orville Wright famously 
took the controls of the magnificent Wright ‘Flyer’ in 1903 and became airborne for a 
distance approximately the length of a modern Boeing 747-400 (Crouch, 2003). However, the 
wooden flyer had initially stalled during the Wright brothers’ first attempt at flight, and this 
was arguably the first ever man-machine aviation-related accident, as described in this 
paragraph by Wilbur Wright after the incident: ‘…the power is ample, and but for a trifling 
error due to lack of experience with this machine and this method of starting, the machine 
would undoubtedly have flown beautifully’ (Crouch, 2003, p. 43). The aircraft that Orville 
flew on that important day in history was also the starting point in the aviation advances from 
an extremely manual mode of flight to the point of automation and computerisation found on 
the modern flight deck today.  
 
A vast difference in design exists between the aircraft being built today and the wooden 
device flown by the Wright brothers over a century ago. The present  advanced flight deck 
incorporates flight data information on cathode ray tubes (CRTs) and liquid crystal displays 
(LCDs) – the main reason that many observers refer to these systems as ‘glass cockpits’ 
(Risukhin, 2001). According to Risukhin (2001), the complete digitised flight deck system 
consists of electronic attitude director indicators (EADIs); electronic horizontal situation 
indicators (EHSIs); data management systems (FMS) and symbol generators to drive the 
electronic indicators; navigation system control and display units (ND); and air data systems. 
Various crew alerting systems (in Boeing the EICAS, and in Airbus the ECAM) are 
incorporated on the modern flight deck to support pilots to operate aircraft more safely in 
today’s congested airspace. This includes for example a Traffic Collision and Avoidance 
System (TCAS) and Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT) avoidance equipment, such as the 
Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) technology  
 
The modern jet airliner has evolved from that first flight of the imagination of Leonardo Da 
Vinci and is the culmination of that dream, integrating in its complex technology almost all of 
humankind’s scientific thought to date (Paolo, 2001). Only computer technology has 
paralleled aviation in its rapid evolutionary advance; and the modern jet airliner is the proud 
heir of both fields of human endeavour, combining aviation and computer technology in an 
elegant fusion. The quantum leap in flight deck design and layout is evidenced from the 
impressive glass panel displays found on the modern advanced aircraft. 
 
Although flight deck automation has been well received by the aviation industry and pilots, 
many human factor issues have been raised. Research suggests that the increased presence of 
computers (such as flight management computers, FMC’s) on board modern flight decks have 
resulted in some flight crew members’ spending an increasing amount of ‘heads-down’ time 
during critical phases of flight, a key contribution to distractions resulting in an incident or 
accident (Damos, John & Lyall, 2005). Traditionally, the operation of analogue flight deck 
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aircraft meant that pilots were often making an exceedingly large number of minute mistakes. 
The modern advanced flight deck incorporates highly sophisticated computers which now 
take care of the mundane or routine aircraft operations. Any mistakes committed by the 
human operator on a modern flight deck are more likely to result in a catastrophic disaster 
(Edwards, 1988). For example, the use of reduced or flexible thrust take-offs have become an 
everyday method of ameliorating wear and tear on jet engines. However, an error in the input 
of the correct temperature (a two-digit number) into the flight management computer may 
result in disaster if the aircraft fails to accelerate during the take-off phase (when the assumed 
temperature is far higher then is actually required). This highlights the fallibility of the basic 
computer-human dyadic. Experts in the field refer to this as GIGO or ‘garbage-in-garbage-
out’ (Damos et al., 2005). In other words, this dyadic is only as strong as the weakest link, the 
human being. There is ample proof that human error is a root cause of accidents in complex 
systems (NTSB, 2009).  
 
Analyses of the reasons and variables implicated in aircraft incidents and accidents indicated 
that the rise in the number of aircraft accidents in the past  20 years have emerged as a 
symptom of the increasing use of automation throughout the world aviation industry. (FAA, 
1996; Ishibashi, Kanda & Ishida,1999; Skitka, Mosier, Burdick & Rosenblatt,2000). 
Examples of accidents were the breakdown in flightcrew/automation coordination were the 
main contributor factor included an Airbus A300-600 operated by China Airlines that crashed 
at Nagoya in 1994; a Boeing 757 operated by American Airlines that crashed near Cali, 
Columbia in1995; and recently a Boeing 737-800 operated by Turkish Airlines that went 
down in a muddy field less than a mile short of the runway at Amsterdam's Schiphol airport 
shortly before it was due to land on 25 February 2009.   
 
However, it is a statistically documented fact that commercial jet air travel is still the safest 
mode of transportation known to mankind (NTSB, 2009) – and this is why the public is often 
confused, shocked and horrified by any accidents involving advanced automated aircraft 
(Risukhin, 2001). In trying to answer the question of why such accidents happen, one must 
critically analyse the new problems and challenges presented by the introduction and 
utilisation of computerisation in aircraft (Risukhin, 2001). It is therefore important to 
understand the human perception of an advanced automated environment in the execution of 
the safe operation of these aircraft. A negative or false perception of technology and 
automation may have an adverse impact on safety issues, but over-familiarity with the system 
may bring about boredom, fatigue and complacency.  
 
Human factor issues and automation 
 
The term “automation” has for some time been difficult to define, although many researchers 
working in the field have agreed that the term “…generally means replacing human 
functioning with machine functioning”, whilst in the term flight deck automation “…we 
generally mean that some tasks or portions of tasks performed by the human crew can be 
assigned, by the choice of the crew, to machinery” (Wiener, 1989, p.  121). Funk, Lyall, 
Wilson, Vint, Niemczyk, Surotegu and Owen (1999, p. 56) also indicated that “Automation is 
the allocation of functions to machines that would otherwise be allocated to humans”.  
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The integration of automation into commercial aircraft flight decks has contributed to 
economic profitability of airlines, has allowed more efficient flight path management and 
reduced the number of crew needed for operation from three to two simultaneously improving 
overall safety (Kabbani 1995; Rudisill, 1995;  Wiener, 1993). However, while there were 
benefits from automation, several unique human factor issues have been raised by both the 
civil aviation authorities and by human behaviour experts (Billings, 1997; FAA, 1996; Kabay, 
1996; Palmer, 1995; Parasuraman, & Riley, 1997, Wood, 2004). These human factor issues 
relate to concerns about poor interface design, pilot complacency and over-reliance on 
automation, a loss of manual flying skills, and pilots' lack of understanding of the new 
equipment, mode errors and 'automation surprises'.  
 
Aviation human factors literature (FAA, 1996; Funk, Lyall, & Riley, 1995; Funk and Lyall, 
1999, 2000; Funk et al., 1999; Kabbani, 1995, Rudisill, 1995; Sarter, 1995, 1996; Sherman, 
Helmreich & Merritt, 1997; Wood, 2004) refers to many problems and concerns with flight 
deck automation. The most comprehensive study on automation issues affecting pilots 
operating advanced   automated aircraft was coordinated and reported by Funk, Lyall, & 
Riley, 1995, Funk and Lyall, 1999, 2000, and Funk et al., 1999.  The contribution of various 
aviation scholars and aviation operators resulted in research output that have been intergraded 
and documented in the public domain and can easily be accessed via the worl wide web. 
Various contributors have identified 92 critical issues affecting pilots with regard to 
automation and the operation of advanced aircraft. The 92 issues which were identified by 
analysing different sources and surveying actual operators are too cumbersome to be listed in 
its entirety for this article. However, ranked by the sum of evidence strengths, the following 
10 automation issues were acknowledged by Funk and Lyall (2000:5) as the most significant 
factors affecting pilots operating advanced aircraft. 
 
o Understanding: ‘Pilots may not understand the structure and function of     automation or 
the interaction of automation devices well enough to safely perform their duties’. 
o Mode awareness: ‘The behavior of automation devices -- what they are doing now and 
what they will do in the future based upon pilot input or other factors -- may not be 
apparent to pilots, possibly resulting in reduced pilot awareness of automation behavior 
and goals’. 
o Complacency/Trust: ‘Pilots may become complacent because they are overconfident in 
and uncritical of automation, and fail to exercise appropriate vigilance, sometimes to the 
extent of abdicating responsibility to it. This can lead to unsafe conditions’. 
o Design: ‘Displays (including aural warnings and other auditory displays), display 
formats, and display elements may not be designed for detectability, discriminability, and 
interpretability. This may cause important information to be missed or misinterpreted’. 
o Training: ‘Training philosophy, objectives, methods, materials, or equipment may be 
inadequate to properly train pilots for safe and effective automated aircraft operation’. 
o Inappropriate usage: ‘Pilots may use automation in situations where it should not be 
used’. 
o Complexity: ‘Automation may be too complex, in that it may consist of many interrelated 
components and may operate under many different modes. This makes automation 
difficult for pilots to understand and use safely’. 
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o Surprise events: ‘Automation may perform in ways that are unintended, unexpected, and 
perhaps unexplainable by pilots, possibly creating confusion, increasing pilot workload to 
compensate, and sometimes leading to unsafe conditions’. 
o Dissemination of information: ‘Important information that could be displayed by 
automation is not displayed, thereby limiting the ability of pilots to make safe decisions 
and actions’.   
o Reduced skill: ‘Pilots may lose psychomotor and cognitive skills required for flying 
manually, or for flying non-automated aircraft, due to extensive use of automation’. 
  
A qualitative analysis of the freehand comments of 400 pilots by Rudisill (1995), based on 
the results from an international survey conducted by James, McClumpha, Green, Wilson and 
Belyavin (1991a) revealed issues closely aligned with the top ten issues as reported in the 
automation data base. The results of this examination resulted in the following issues and 
recommendations from Rudisill (1995): 
o  General issues related to automation: The general agreement among participants was 
that automation was a good thing. However, concerns were raised that inexperienced 
pilots may be led into a false sense of security by the automatics. One solution proposed 
to resolve this issue is to provide mechanisms for inexperienced pilots to gain and develop 
a firm base in piloting skill. 
o   Flight deck design issues: In general the respondents were happy with the overall design 
in the automated cockpit. Issues were raised, however, regarding the interpretation of 
flight instrument displays and unnoticed events in map shift (loss of accuracy in 
navigational displays). Rudisill (1995) suggests that transition training for new ‘glass’ 
pilots should emphasise self-discipline and vigilance in monitoring raw data information. 
o      Understanding how to use automation: The general comments from participants 
regarding the integration and use of automation elements was positive. Some issues raised 
in this respect concerned pilots’ lack of knowledge about the intended behaviour of the 
aircraft in certain modes of flight. Pilots should have the ability to disconnect the 
automation and take manual control in the event of adverse aircraft behaviour in critical 
phases of flight to mitigate uncertainty (Rudisill, 1995). 
o       Crew coordination and personal issues: Respondents commented that ‘automation 
may reduce workload in low workload flight phases and may increase workload in high 
workload flight phases; also, workload may be increased dramatically during abnormal 
situations and failures’ (Rudisill, 1995, p. 290). It was also noted that crews were affected 
by boredom and complacency during periods of low workload. Again, crew discipline and 
improved systems knowledge helps to minimise this kind of problem.   
 
Other studies conducted by Mosier, Skitka, Heers and Burdick (1998) have found extensive 
evidence that the advanced flight deck and the extensive use of automation have created an 
environment of automation bias and flawed heuristics (as a short-cut to decision-making, a 
symptom of complacency) which may threaten safety. As early as the 1990’s, research 
conducted by Parasuraman, Molloy and Singh (1993) and Parasuraman and Riley (1997), 
identified the need to optimise pilot workload in order to reduce boredom and mitigate the 
consequences of complacency. The identification of workload optimisation is important on an 
advanced flight deck. In an attempt to evaluate the differences in workload between pilots 
flying traditional analogue aircraft versus pilots operating modern flight deck aircraft, 
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Laudeman and Palmer (1992), found a significant difference in aircrew performance. They 
indicated that those pilots that prefer to make use of the automated features in modern flight 
decks experienced higher workloads than those in traditional cockpits as well as those in 
automated flight decks that opt not to use the automation.  Damos, John and Lyall (2005) also 
examined how the frequencies of 23 activities varied as a function of cockpit automation. The 
study examined general ‘house-keeping’ activities and communication, as well as flight path 
control, which may be regarded as one of the most fundamental factors in reducing aircraft 
accidents and incidents. That is, maintaining the correct flight profile is what keeps an aircraft 
in the correct (safe) three-dimensional space. Human factor errors emerge when the pilot has 
to cope with and integrate an excessive number of sources of information. Paradoxically, 
behavioural errors can also occur when the workload is too low. Workload conflict appears to 
be a problem that contributes to human error on the advanced flight deck (Kantowitz & 
Casper, 1988).  
  
Because of the concerns of the effects of advanced automation on pilots behaviour, the United 
Kingdom (UK) Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) requested the RAF Institute of Aviation 
Medicine ‘to assess the effects of advance automation on UK pilots in order to identify 
possible problems’ and to research the ‘opinions and attitudes of UK pilots to advance flight 
deck automation’ (James et al., 1991a, p. 3.2). The researchers developed a questionnaire that 
included 78 items to assess pilots’ opinions regarding aircraft automation. Ten of the items 
were related to general attitude towards aircraft automation and 68 items addresses several 
human factor concerns and automation issues on advanced flight decks. This included design, 
reliability, flight management system input, output and feedback, skills, training, crew 
interaction, monitoring and procedures, workload, and overall impressions.  All the items of 
the questionnaire comprised of two statements defining opposite viewpoints with a Likert 
type scale, from 1 to 5 between them, indicating grades of opinion. 
 
 James et al. (1991a) used the questionnaire to survey the opinion of UK commercial pilots 
towards advanced flight deck automation. The attitude survey was distributed to all UK 
licensed pilots (approximately 11000). 1372 questionnaires were returned of which 572 were 
usable. Principle components analysis with varimax rotation of the responses on the 68 items 
identified four main factors. These were Understanding/Mastery, Workload, Design, and 
Skills. The four factors accounted for 31.48% of the explained variance (James et al., 1991a, 
pp. 3.2-3.5). Understanding/Mastery consisted of ‘comprehension, expertise, knowledge and 
use of the system.’ Workload entailed ‘workload, demand, stress and task efficiency.’ Design 
referred to ‘ergonomic efficiency, design and displays’ and Skills encompassed handling 
skills, crew interaction, and self-confidence’ (p.3.5). Unfortunately the authors did not report 
on the reliability of the four factors, neither did they provide a list of all the significant items 
that signify the rotated factors (James et al., 1991a, b; McClumpha, James, Green, & 
Belyavin, 1991). 
 
Singh, Deaton and Parasuraman (2001) ’developed (sic) a scale to assess pilot attitudes 
towards cockpit automation’. They used 30 items of the original questionnaire of the James et 
al. (1991a) survey. These items included the first 10 general attitude items and 20 items 
associated with the humanfactors and automated systems. Singh et al., (2001) used both 
positive and negative statements in the 30 item questionnaire. The favorable statements were 
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scored on a scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5) and the unfavorable 
statements were scored on a scale ranging from strongly agree (1) to strongly disagree (5) 
(Singh et al. 2001, p. 208).   
The questionnaire was administered to 170 pilots at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. 
163 pilots with experience of advanced automated aircraft responded on the survey of which 
111 completed the questionnaires satisfactory. Principal component analysis with varimax 
rotation of the responses on the 20 item section of the questionnaire revealed the presence of 
six factors with eigen values greater than one (Singh et al., 2001, p.208). These six factors, 
that accounted for 58, 3% of the explained variance, were named: workload (5 items with 
loadings of 0.58 to 0.77); design (5 items with loadings of 0.35 to 0.74); skills (4 items with 
loadings of 0.37 to 0.71); feedback (3 items with loadings of 0.63 to 0.70); reliability (4 items 
with loadings of 0.33 to 0.82); and self-confidence (3 items with loadings of 0.31 to 0.85). 
The reliability of the six factors was also computed using coefficient alpha which ranged 
from 0.75 to 0.98. Although the Singh et al., (2001) reported satisfactory reliability 
coefficients the inclusion of three items that cross-loaded on more than one factor are highly 
questionable.  If these three items were omitted from the last two factors, both reliability and 
self-confidence would not have been included in the underlying factor structure of the 
questionnaire. According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007, p. 646) the interpretation of factors 
defined by only one or two variables is not feasible.  
 
Further research into human-automation interaction in today’s advanced automated aircraft 
remains important to identify the core human factor concerns and automation issues related to 
current flight deck automation. The present study is an effort to aid in the identifying and 
describing specific areas of pilots concern regarding their performance in a highly advanced 
automated environment and their opinion about advanced automation systems. This article 
builds on the research of James et al. (1991a) to extend our knowledge and understanding of 
pilots’ attitudes towards aircraft automation.  The present study, however, differs from the 
preceding study in several ways.  First, it examined the perception of airline pilots from a 
single South African airline. Second, all the pilots in the sample operate advanced third and 
fourth generation automated aircraft -- the state of the art technology in the industry today. 
Third, it focused on specific variables (individual and situational) that may account for 
variance in pilots’ perception towards flight deck automation. New items were generated and 
a number of the original items from the survey of James et al. (1991a) were adapted to ensure 
relevance to the operational procedures and the types of aircraft the airline operates.  
 
The primary objective of part 1 of this study was therefore to construct a valid and reliable 
instrument to measure the perceptions of airline pilots towards the core automation issues 
linked with operating advanced automated aircraft and to offer psychometric evidence for 
such a measure, termed the Automation Attitude Questionnaire (AAQ).  
.  
 
 
 
Research design 
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Research approach 
 
In order to achieve the study objective a quantitative research approach based on the 
positivist paradigm was followed. A survey was conducted, using a structured 
questionnaire to collect the research data from a purposive sample of airline pilots. The 
data were analysed in accordance with the associational design as suggested by Field 
(2005, pp. 107, 619, 667). The associational design was used to establish the correlation 
between items scores on the questionnaire. The inter-correlation coefficients were 
employed to identify the underlying dimensions or factor structure of the questionnaire and 
to calculate the internal consistency and unidimensionality of the factors.  
 
Research method 
 
Participants 
The research group represented a purposive sample of 262 current airline pilots at a major 
South African carrier operating both Airbus and Boeing type aircraft. Biographical 
information was elicited from all the participants in the first section of the questionnaire. 
The biographical characteristics of the participants are summarized in Table 1. Of this group, 
245 were male pilots and 17 were female pilots. The small proportion (6.5%) of female 
participants was due to the fact that women have only recently started choosing professional 
flying as a career option. These numbers reflect the current low proportional representation 
of female pilots (6.1%) engaged in commercial aviation in South Africa (SACAA, 2007).  
The sample ranged from lower entry pilots (in-flight relief crew) to high level pilots (senior 
training captains on long-range flights). It also represented diversity in terms of the type of 
aircraft flown, pilots’ age and level of experience. 35.5% of the respondents had flown 
Boeing and 63.4% had flown Airbus type aircraft. The participants’ ages ranged from 25 to 
65 years (a spread of 40 years). There mean age was 44.14 years (SD = 9.556). The 
respondents’ number of years of flying experience ranged from between 4 years and 46 years, 
with an mean of 23.73 years (SD = 10.373). The mean number of flying hours of the sample 
was 12 231 hours (SD = 5 636). The mean digital flight hours logged by the sample was 
4 691.13 hours (SD = 2 530.004). The total digital flying time logged was expected to be 
significantly lower than the total flying time, as the carrier only began to operate modern 
automated aircraft in the last ten years or so. Only 24.9% of the respondents had any 
university level education. 
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Table 1. 
Biographical Data of Respondents. 
VARIABLE FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE 
 
GENDER 
Male 
Female 
 
 
245 
17 
 
 
93.5% 
6.5% 
 
 
POSITION 
Dedicated in-flight relief pilot 
Co-pilot (Short Range) 
Co-pilot (Long Range) 
Captain (Short Range) 
Captain (Long Range) 
Training Captain (Short Range) 
Training Captain (Long Range) 
Other 
 
 
16 
60 
49 
48 
53 
11 
18 
5 
 
 
 
6.1% 
22.9% 
18.7% 
18.3% 
20.2% 
4.2% 
6.9% 
1.9% 
 
 
AGE 
25 – 35 years 
36 – 45 years 
46 – 55 years 
56 – 65 years 
 
 
 
59 
88 
67 
48 
 
 
22.5% 
33.6% 
25.6% 
18.3% 
LEVEL OF EDUCATION 
High school 
Diploma 
Bachelors degree 
Post Graduate 
 
163 
 33 
 40 
 25 
 
62.5% 
12.6% 
15.3% 
 9.6% 
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INITIAL FLYING TRAINING 
Military 
Cadet 
Self (Part-Time) 
Self (Full Time) 
 
131 
  21 
  72 
  37 
 
50.0% 
 8.0% 
27.5% 
14.1% 
EXPERT YEARS 
 
4 to 15 years 
16 to 25 years 
26 to 35 years 
36 to 46 years 
Missing 
 
 
 63 
 89 
 65 
 44 
   1 
 
 
24.0% 
34.0% 
24.8% 
16.8% 
  0.4% 
 
 
 
TOTAL DIGITAL FLYING TIME 
LOGGED 
0 to 2 000 hours 
2 001 to 3 000 hours 
 
3 001 to 4 000 hours 
4 001 to 5 000 hours 
5 001 to 6 000 hours 
            >6 001 hours 
Missing 
 
 
 
33 
 53 
  
46 
 48 
 20 
 60 
   2 
 
 
 
12.6% 
20.2% 
 
17.6% 
18.3% 
 7.6% 
22.9% 
 0.8% 
 
 
TOTAL FLYING TIME LOGGED 
 
1 500 to 7 900 hours 
7 901 to 11 200 hours 
11 201 to 16 000 hours 
16 001 to 27 000 hours 
Missing 
 
 
 
 65 
 69 
 56 
 69 
   3 
 
 
 
24.8% 
26.3% 
21.4% 
26.3% 
  1.1% 
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Measuring Instrument 
 
To identify the core human factor issues related to current flight deck automation and to 
assess airline pilots’ perceptions of these issues, a measuring instrument called the 
Automation Attitude Questionnaire (AAQ) was constructed. Various research output in the 
field of flight deck automation were considered as points of departure in constructing the 
AAQ. The Items for the AAQ were generated by analysing the fundamental framework of 
research undertaken by Wiener (1989) and studies conducted by Funk and Lyall (2000), 
James, et al. (1991a, b) and Sherman et al., (1997).  
 
The item pool of the initial AAQ included 85 items. Thirty three of these items were firstly 
selected and adopted from the 78 items of the attitude survey developed by James, et al., 
(1991a,b). Secondly, a further 35 items were extracted from the survey and adjusted to ensure 
clarity and relevance in the context of the South African airline that participated in the current 
study. Afterwards, these items were added to the AAQ. Thirdly, after discussions with experts 
and a further analysis of the literature, 17 new items were generated and were included in the 
questionnaire. Each of the 85 items of the initial AAQ presented one statement that covered 
various domains that encompass automation training, flying skills, workload, ergonomics, 
automation performance etc. All the statements (except for the biographic variables) were 
rated on a seven-point Likert-type scale to measure the perceptions of respondents at an 
approximate interval level. Unfavourable statements were scored on a scale ranging from 
strongly agree (1) to strongly disagree (7).  The favourable statements were reverse coded to 
produce a measure where high scores indicated positive perceptions and low scores resulted 
in a more negative perception of automation. 
 
In its final form, the preliminary AAQ consisted of three sections. Section 1 related to the 
pilots’ biographical information. Section 2 consisted of the 85 items related to pilots’ 
perceptions, opinions and behaviour regarding automation. This second section attempted to 
determine the core human factor issues and pilot concerns related to flight deck automation. 
An additional part, section 3 was added to gain qualitative input from respondents. 
Participants were given the opportunity to comment, either positively or negatively on 
operating highly advanced automated aircraft. 
 
Research procedure 
 
A list of all the airline pilots employed at a large South African carrier was obtained from the 
organisation’s human resources department. Permission was granted from the executive and 
chief pilot of the particular company to distribute the questionnaires to the entire pilot 
population in their employment. A total of 800 questionnaires were distributed on an 
individual basis via a box-drop method.  
 
In order to maximise the response rate a cover letter with the endorsement from management 
was attached to each questionnaire. The cover letter also stated the purpose of the research 
and further stressed voluntary participation and anonymity. Anonymity was ensured by 
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eliminating the need to provide a name on the questionnaire. The completed questionnaires 
were collected manually from a dedicated collection box. A total of 262 (33%) usable 
questionnaires were received. According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), this number of 
responses was adequate for an exploratory factor analysis.  
 
Statistical analysis   
The main statistical analyses for the study were accomplished through the utilisation of the 
Windows Statistical Programme for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 15. Exploratory 
factor analysis (EFA) was used to explore the internal structure and validity of the AAQ. EFA 
was carried out by means of principal axis factoring and rotated using the promax procedure 
with Kaiser’s normalization to obtain an oblique generated factor solution for the AAQ. To 
assess compliance with the distribution requirements, Bartlett’s test of sphericity and the 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy were used. In order to determine 
the number of significant item factors, Kaiser’s criterion, Horn’s parallel analysis and Catell’s 
scree-plot were used (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). According to Hayton, Allen and Scarpello 
(2004), parallel analysis provides the most accurate estimate of the number of true factors in a 
complex dataset. The internal consistency of the AAQ was assessed by calculating the 
Cronbach Alpha coefficient for each factor.  Item-reliability index of the individual items 
were calculated to establish whether the items contributed to the underlying construct of the 
factors (Gregory, 2004), and the average correlations between the items of each factor were 
calculated to examine the homogeneity and unidimensionality of the retained factors 
(Cortina, 1993; Clark & Watson, 1995). Frequencies and distributive statistics were used to 
describe the characteristics of the sample and to analyse the distribution (mean, standard 
deviations, skweness and kurtosis) of the responses.  
 
Results 
 
Exploratory Factor Analysis 
 
The Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was carried out by means of principal axis factoring, 
and was rotated using the promax procedure (κ = 4) with Kaiser’s normalisation to an oblique 
solution. This allowed the researchers to seek the lowest number of factors that account 
for the common variance in the set of 85 variables. In the first round of EFA, the 85 items 
of the AAQ were inter-correlated and rotated to form a simple structure by means of the 
promax rotation. Owing to the size (85 X 85), the inter-correlation matrix is not reported in 
the study. Based on Kaiser's (1961) criterion (eigenvalues larger than unity) 25 factors were 
postulated. The 25 factors explained 67.79% of the variance in the factor space of data. The 
factor analysis yielded more factors in the real test space than was expected. This is probably 
due to the presence of differentially skew items, as described by Schepers (1992). However, 
the results of Horn’s parallel analysis and the scree-plot presented in Figure 1 confirmed that 
there were five significant constructs in the dataset. Parallel analysis indicated a break in the 
scree-plot between roots six and five. However, the curve of the eigenvalues of the random 
data set (the broken line) intersected the curve of the eigenvalues for the real data (the solid 
line) at root six. To avoid under-factoring, it was decided to include all the items of the six 
factors in the second round of EFA.  
139
 
The items included in the six factors were first scrutinised; and the items which had factor 
loadings lower than 0.35 were omitted. A total of 33 items were retained and were subjected 
to the second round of EFA with promax rotation. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test for 
measuring sampling adequacy and Bartlett’s test of sphericity displayed satisfactory results. 
Both diagnostic tests confirmed that the data was suitable for factor analysis. The calculated 
KMO value of 0.902 was greater than 0.7. Bartlett’s test of sphericity [χ2 (528) = 3470.758, 
p<0.01] confirmed that the properties of the correlation matrix of the item scores were 
suitable for factor analysis.  
 
Six factors with eigenvalues higher than one were extracted in the second round of EFA. The 
six factors explained 55.297 percent of the total variance in the data. However, an inspection 
of the results of the parallel analysis presented in Figure 2, a five factors solution seemed 
more appropriate. Only one noteworthy item with a loading of 0.369 was associated with 
Factor Six. According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007, p. 646), the interpretation of factors 
defined by only one or two variables is ‘risky’, under even the most exploratory of factor 
analyses. Consequently, Factor Six was disregarded. This resulted in a 32 item questionnaire 
that measure five factors related to flight deck automation. Of the 85 items included in the 
preliminary AAQ, 13 of the 33 original items and 13 of the 35 adjusted items from the James, 
et al. (1991a) survey, and five of the 17 new items were retained.  
 
Figure 1. 
Scree plot of the actual and the random data of 85 factors. 
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The factor loadings and corrected Item-total correlation of the items in each of the five factors 
of the AAQ are summarized in Table 2. The corrected item-total correlation of each item in 
the five factors was satisfactory and comply with the criteria suggested by DeVellis (2003) 
and Field (2005). DeVellis (2003) views an item with an item-total correlation of more than 
0.20 as generally acceptable to be included.  Field (2005) however, suggested that if an item-
total correlation is less than 0.3, that a particular item should not be included as a variable in a 
scale. The values of the corrected item-total correlation in the five factors were all above 0.3. 
The percentage variance, sums of squared loadings, squared multiple correlations and factor 
correlations are reported in Table 3. 
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Table 2. 
The factor loadings and corrected item-total correlation of the items that define the five 
factors of the AAQ. 
Factor and Relevant  Items Factor 
Loading 
Corrected  
Item-total  
Correlation 
Factor 1 
 
 
Q38. I'm often confused about why the aircraft's automatics 
respond in the way it does. 
 
 
0.831 0.724 
Q36. I am often surprised by the aircraft's response to my 
FMS inputs.  
0.816 0.722 
Q40. I often tend to question the output from the automation 
system. 
0.624 0.638 
Q41. I find myself trying to guess what this aircraft is going 
to do next. 
0.610 0.610 
Q23. In the event of a partial system failure, it is never 
obvious which part of the automatic system failed. 
0.567 0.475 
Q37. I feel that the amount of feedback I get from the 
automatics is excessive. 
0.557 0.557 
Q42. The feedback I get in response to my inputs is usually 
too slow. 
0.546 0.512 
Q39. Even after receiving adequate feedback from the 
system, I still won't correct my fault. 
0.433 0.519 
 
Factor 2 
 
Q56. I think that there should be more simulator training for 
the conversion onto this aircraft. 
 
Q55. The computer based-training was insufficient for me to 
fully understand this aircraft. 
 
 
 
 
0.831 
 
 
0.694 
 
0.698 
 
0.556 
 
142
Q57. I feel that a lot more hours can be devoted to route 
training on this aircraft. 
0.641 0.577 
Q54. I think that there should have been a lot more 
classroom training for the conversion onto this aircraft. 
0.631 0.644 
Q58. There is insufficient recurrent training on this aircraft. 0.589 0.544 
Q59. The training I received was inappropriate to line 
operations. 
0.444 0.498 
 
Q60. My transition onto this aircraft was extremely difficult. 
 
Factor 3 
 
0.367 0.443 
Q78. I feel detached from the aircraft. 0.813 0.678 
Q79. I feel exposed to risk by the automation. 0.745 0.683 
Q77. The aircraft is always ahead of me. 0.671 0.642 
Q80. Whenever I fly this aircraft, I feel a lot more stress then 
when I flew traditional aircraft. 
0.605 
0.594 
Q75. The automation system greatly decreases my 
confidence as a pilot. 
0.509 0.569 
Q64. Automation impedes crew co-ordination. 0.495 
0.651 
 
Factor 4 
 
Q73. The automation actually increases workload during 
critical phases of flight. 
 
 
0.797 0.641 
Q72. In the event of a flight plan change, the ‘heads-down’ 
time required is much more than in traditional flight decks. 
  
0.733 0.591 
Table 2 continued 
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Q69. I've noticed that there is much more ‘heads-down’ time 
in this cockpit. 
0.575 0.465 
Q71. It is very difficult for the crew to maintain a good look-
out when flying this aircraft. 
0.567 
0.583 
Q74. In general the overall workload on this flight deck has 
increased. 
0.524 0.528 
Q70. The procedures used to operate this aircraft don't suit it 
at all. 
 
 
Factor 5 
 
0.367 0.494 
Q16. I find that the aircraft automatics are extremely 
unreliable. 
0.646 
0.540 
Q13. The displays in my aircraft make very poor use of 
colour. 
0.590 
0.438 
Q17. The level of reliability and redundancy of the 
automatics is insufficient to conduct extended range 
operations. 
 
0.522 
0.445 
Q14. I'm extremely unhappy with the set-up of the displays 
in my aircraft. 
0.500 
0.424 
Q21. If the automatics fail, most of the time I don't try to 
restore the system. 
0.421 
0.404 
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Table 3. 
 Eigenvalues, Percentage Variance, Sums of Squared Loadings, Squared Multiple 
Correlations and Factor Correlations of the Five Factors of the AAQ. 
 
Factors 1 2 3 4 5 
Eigenvalues 9.577 2.315 2.049 1.780 1.473 
Percentage Variance 29.022 7.014 6.210 5.393 4.463 
Sums of Squared Loadings (SSL) 7.071 5.453 6.797 5.450 3.872 
Squared Multiple Correlation 
(SMC)             
0.991 0.974 0.977 0.980 0.930 
 
Factor inter-correlation matrix 
Factors 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Comprehension - 0.509 0.603 0.515 0.488 
2. Training 0.509 - 0.501 0.419 0.250 
3. Trust 0.603 0.501 - 0.569 0.412 
4. Workload 0.515 0.419 0.569 - 0.351 
5. Design 0.488 0.250 0.412 0.351 - 
 
The five factor solution explains 51.102 percent of the total variance in the data. The five 
factors inter-correlated significantly with one another (r = 0.250 to 0.603).  The strength of 
the correlations indicates that the five factors are closely related in measuring constructs 
related to flight deck automation. Although the relatively high inter-correlations suggest 
overlapping variability, the Squared Multiple Correlations (SMCs) of 0.930 to 0.991 between 
the item scores and the factor scores indicated that all the factors were sufficiently defined by 
the relevant items. The factor scores of the respondents were calculated by means of Bartlett’s 
method as described in Tabachnick and Fidell (2007, p.  651). Scales were created for each 
factor and these were labeled according to the general content of their significant related 
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items. The five factors or core automation issues linked with operating advanced automated 
aircraft were labeled Comprehension, Training, Trust, Workload and Design respectively.  
 
The reliability of the five factors of the AAQ 
 
The reliability of the factors of the Automation Attitude Questionnaire was determined by 
making use of Cronbach’s coefficient alpha (Field, 2005). The average mean correlations 
between the items of each factor were also calculated to examine the internal 
homogeneity and unidimensionality of the five factors (Cortina, 1993; Clark & Watson, 
1995). The means, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis, average mean correlations 
and Cronbach's Alpha for the five factors are provided in Table 4.  
 
Table 4. 
Descriptive Statistics and Reliability of the Factors of the AAQ (n=262). 
Descriptive 
Statistics 
Compre 
hension 
Training Trust Workload Design 
Mean 46.267 38.821 37.798 32.034 31.053 
SD 7.079 7.401 4.606 6.224 3.992 
Skewness -1.265 -0.675 -1.584 -0.728 -2.085 
Sk error 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.150 
Kurtosis 2.124 0.011 3.323 0.302 7.276 
Ku error 0.300 0.300 0.300 0.300 0.300 
r(Mean) 0.59 0.56 0.63 0.55 0.45 
Alpha 0.84 0.82 0.85 0.79 0.70 
 
According to Table 4, the Cronbach alpha coefficients for the five factors of the AAQ were 
satisfactory. Compared to the guideline for alpha ≥0.70, recommended by Nunnally and 
Bernstein (1994), the alpha coefficient for the five factors yielded acceptable values (F1 
=0.844; F2 =0.817; F3 =0.845; F4 =0.786; F5 =0.700). Furthermore, none of the items, if 
deleted, increases the internal consistency of a factor. All the mean inter-item correlations of 
the five factors were within the range of 0.15 to 0.50 as suggested by Clark and Watson 
(1995).The high mean inter-item correlations of 0.45 to 0.63 is probably the result of the 
specificity of the target constructs.  According to Clark and Watson (1995), a much higher 
average inter-item correlation can be expected when one is measuring a narrow construct. The 
scores on the five factors of the AAQ appear to satisfy the requirements of homogeneity and 
unidimensionality and can be considered to be representative of the specific factor that 
they are assessing.  
 
Discussion 
 
The implementation of aircraft automation has for some time been the root of many debates 
within the aviation fraternity. The introduction of highly computerised flight deck technology 
has presented airline organisations with interesting human resource challenges. These 
challenges need to be met so as to maintain an efficient and optimal operational front. The 
perceptions of airline pilots with regard to flight deck automation issues has not yet been 
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researched in South Africa and one of the challenges facing airlines is to determine what 
impact these perceptions have on successfully training and converting competent pilots to 
new advanced jet aircraft from traditional older generation aircraft (Barnett, 2005). The 
objective of part one of this study was therefore,  to construct a valid and reliable instrument 
to measure the perceptions of airline pilots towards the core automation issues linked with 
operating advanced automated aircraft and to assess the psychometric properties of the 
measure  and to refine the instrument.  
 
A questionnaire named the Automation Attitude Questionnaire or AAQ was constructed to 
survey airline pilots’ perceptions regarding automation issues linked with operating advanced 
automated aircraft. A total of 85 items were initially included in the AAQ. After two 
applications of exploratory factor analysis 32 of these items yielded a five-factor solution. 
The five factors showed adequate factorial validity, unidimensionality and reliability. The 
magnitudes of the factor scores off the items in each of the five factors were all larger then 
0.35 with factor scores ranging from 0.36 to 0.83. The mean inter-item correlations ranged 
from 0.45 to 0.63 and the alpha coefficients from 0.73 to 0.85. These results provided 
sufficient support for the psychometric adequacy of the AAQ. 
The five factors that associated with the core issues or demands of operating an automated 
flight deck or glass cockpit were labeled Comprehension, Training, Trust, Workload and 
Design.  
 
Comprehension consisted of 8 items and includes issues such as how a pilot interprets and 
understands the capabilities, limitations, modes, and operating principles and functioning of 
the automated flight deck system. This factor includes pilot’s competence to interpret the 
flight mode annunciator (FMA) and manage automation “surprises” (Parasuraman & Riley, 
1997). 
 
Training, the second dimension, was made up of seven items that refers to the training and 
learning required to get a pilot to an adequate standard or to the level needed to operate the 
automation system. The elements of this factor refer to quality time spent in classroom 
training, on simulator training, recurrent training, route training, line training and transition 
training on advanced aircraft.  
 
The third factor was labeled Trust and includes six items that deal with the level of belief and 
assurance a pilot has in the performance of automated devices. It measured pilots’ 
identification with the automation system; feelings of increased exposure to risk and stress 
due to automation, feelings that the aircraft is ahead of him or her; and being detached from 
the human-machine loop. A specific item of this factor also refers to the impedance in crew 
co-ordination due to system trust issues.  
 
The fourth factor looked at perceptions of workload and includes six items.  The primary 
issues covered in this factor are increases in workload during critical phases of flight. 
Elements of the workload factor consist of the amount of time spent instructing the 
automation computer via the flight management system (heads-down time) and thereafter 
having it accomplish a specific task correctly. Other elements also include the procedures 
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required for safely operating the aircraft and the ability to maintain adequate situational 
awareness. 
 
The fifth factor consists of five items related to the design characteristics and reliability of 
automation systems. This includes the ergonomic features and display design of the flight 
deck. Elements of the display design included the adequate presentation of accessible, useful, 
understandable and diagnostic visual and sound information, as well as the ease in utilising 
the information. 
 
The five factors are closely linked to a number of human factor issues and concerns raised 
and cited by various authors in research publications and are also related to automation issues 
documented in international regulatory authority reports such as the FAA of the USA and the 
CAA of the UK. Elements of the present factors parallel those issues and demands associated 
with flight deck automation mentioned by Billings (1997), FAA (1996), Funk and Lyall 
(2000), James et al. (1991a), Mosier, et.al. (1998), Palmer (1995), Parasuraman and Riley 
(1997), Sarter and Woods (1994), Sarter, Woods and Billings (1997), Sherman (1997), 
Wiener (1989), Wood (2004).  These human factor issues included the following variables: 
poor interface design; pilots' lack of understanding of the automated equipment; breakdown 
in attention and knowledge; demands in mode awareness and ‘automation surprises’; uneven 
distribution of workload; over trust and decreased vigilance; pilot complacency and over-
reliance on automation; loss of situational awareness; reduction of manual flying skills and 
proficiency; communication and coordination demands; and the need for new approaches to 
training.  
 
Encouraging is the fact that the five factors identified in the present study also correspond 
with  the ten prominent automation issues identified by Funk and Lyall, 1998 and Funk, et al. 
(1999). After intensive evidence based research, using various sources and criteria, Funk, et 
al., (1999, p. 120), listed the following five automation issues as the most important concerns 
that require solutions: ‘‘understanding of automation may be inadequate; behavior of 
automation may not be apparent; pilots may be overconfident in automation; displays (visual 
and aural) may be poorly designed; and training may be inadequate”.  
 
 A comparison of the results from this survey also indicates a strong commonality with the 
factors identified by James et al., (1991) and Singh et al., (2001). Workload, skills and design 
are common labels with understanding/mastery, self-confidence and comprehension sharing 
similar elements. Feedback, reliability and trust also appear to share common items. Overall 
the results indicate that common threads permeate pilot perceptions of automated flight decks 
and these are consistent over time. The results of this study resonates the capability of the 
AAQ to measure and assess airline pilots’ perception of the most prominent issues and 
concerns in operating advance automated aircraft.  
 
Practical application 
 
The results of the statistical analysis of the responses on the AAQ suggest that the 
questionnaire is sufficiently reliable and valid to capture the present sample of airline pilots’ 
perceptions of flight deck automation. Consequently aviation human factor specialists and 
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aviation psychologists can use the instrument with confidence to gather valid and reliable data 
about automation perceptions held by airline pilots in South Africa. Understanding key 
concepts and fundamental issues associated with attitudes, perceptions and behaviour that 
exist within the sphere of advanced flight decks, has significant benefits for the aviation 
industry at large. A concise understanding of this topic will benefit airlines and other 
organisations to design and develop specifically targeted training material and to positively 
influence their pilots in accepting automation. However, elements that influence overall 
perceptions of automation may depend on the type of organisation, nature of flight training, 
flying experience, type of aircraft, computer literacy, operational position, etc. Further 
research should endeavour to identify those variables that may have an effect on the 
perceptions of airline pilots. In the second part of this research project the relationship 
between the biographical characteristics of the airline pilots’ and their perceptions of 
automation were determined. The responses of the various pilot groups on the AAQ were 
compared to one another and where applicable correlated with their scores on the different 
factors.  These results are offered in the part two of the article series.  
 
Acknowledgements 
 
This article is part of a research project on flight deck automation co-ordinated by Professor 
Dr. Leopold P. Vermeulen (The University of Pretoria).  
 
References 
 
Airbus A380 Cockpit. Retrieved March 29, 2007, from the World Wide Web: http://www. 
gillesvidal.com/blogpano/cockpit1.htm 
Barnett, J. S.  (2005).Training people to use automation: Strategies and methods. Journal of 
Systemics, Cybernetics and Informatics, 3(5), 73-76. 
Billings, C.E. (1997). Aviation Automation. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Clark, L. A. & Watson, D. (1995).  Constructing validity:  Basic issues in objective scale 
development.  Psychological Assessment, 7(3), 309-319. 
Cortina, J. M. (1993).  What is coefficient alpha?  An examination of theory and 
applications.  Journal of Applied Psychology, 78(1), 98-104. 
Crouch, T. D. (2003). The Bishop's Boys: A Life of Wilbur and Orville Wright. New York: W. 
W. Norton & Company.  
Damos, D.L., John, R.S. & Lyall, A.E. (2005). The Effect of Level of Automation on Time 
Spent Looking Out of the Cockpit. The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 
9(3):303-314. 
DeVellis, R. F. (2003). Scale Development: Theory and Applications. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage. 
Edwards, E. (1988). Introductory Overview. In E.L. Wiener & D.C. Nagel (Eds.), Human 
Factors in Aviation, (pp. 3-25). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.   
Field, A. (2005). Discovering Statistics using SPSS. (2nd ed.). London: Sage. 
FAA.  (1996).  The interfaces between flightcrews and modern flight deck systems. Human 
Factors Team, Washington, DC: Federal Aviation Administration. 
149
Funk, K., Lyall, B. & Riley, V. (1995). Flightdeck Automation Problems. Proceedings of the 
Eighth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, (pp.265-269). Columbus, OH: 
The Ohio State University. 
Funk, K., Lyall, B., Wilson, J., Vint, R., Niemczyk, M., Suroteguh, C. & Owen, G. (1999). 
Flight Deck Automation Issues. The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 9(2), 
109-123.  
Funk, K., Lyall, B. (1999).  The evidence for flight deck automation issues. Proceedings of 
the Tenth International Aviation Psychology Symposium Conference(CD-R). Columbus, 
OH: The Ohio State University. 
Funk, K. & Lyall, B. (2000). A Comparative Analysis of Flight Decks with Varying Levels of 
Automation. Final Report prepared for the FAA Chief Scientific and Technical Advisor for 
Human Factors, (pp. 1-17). Washington DC: Federal Aviation Administration. 
Gregory, R. J. (2004).  Psychological testing:  history, principles, and applications, (4th ed.).  
Boston. Pearson Education Group. 
Hayton, J. C., Allen, D. G., & Scarpello, V.  (2004). Factor retention decisions in exploratory 
factor analysis: A tutorial on parallel analysis. Organizational Research Methods, 7(2), 
191-205. 
Ishibashi, A., Kanda, N. & Ishida, T. (1999). Analysis of Aircraft Accidents by Means of 
Variation Tree. Proceedings of the Tenth International Aviation Psychology Symposium 
Conference (CD-R). Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. 
James, M., McClumpha, A., Green, R., Wilson, P. & Belyavin, A. (1991a). Pilot Attitudes to 
Flight Deck Automation. Proceedings of the Royal Aeronautical Society Conference on 
Human Factors on Advanced Flight Decks, (pp. 130 – 158).  London, UK: Human Factors 
Society.  
James, M., McClumpha, A., Green, R., Wilson, P. & Belyavin, A.  (1991b). Pilot attitudes to 
cockpit automation. Proceedings of the Sixth International Symposium of Aviation 
Psychology, (pp.192-198). Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University.  
Kabbani, M.A. (1995). The Glass in the Cockpit – Cloudy or Clear? Proceedings of the 
Eighth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, (pp. 64-67). Columbus, OH: The 
Ohio State University. 
Kabay, M. E. (1996). Advanced Automated Flight Deck Issues. Retrieved April  01, 2007, 
from the World Wide Web:  http://www.ncsa.com/articles/incidents 
Kantowitz, B. & Casper, P. (1988). Human Workload in Aviation. In E. L. Wiener and D.C. 
Nagel (Eds.), Human Factors in Aviation (pp. 157-187). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Laudeman, I. V. & Palmer, E. A. (1992). Measurement of automation effects on aircrew 
workload. In the Third Annual ASIA Program Investigator's Meeting. Moffett Field, CA: 
NASA-Ames Research Center. 
Lyall, B. & Funk, K. (1998).  Flight Deck Automation Issues. In M.W. Scerbo & M. Mouloua 
(Eds.), Proceedings of the Third Conference on Automation Technology and Human 
Performance, (pp. 288-292).  Norfolk, VA, March 25-28, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates.  
McClumpha, A. J., James, M., Green, R. G., & Belyavin, A. J. (1991).  Pilots’Attitudes to 
Cockpit Automation. In Proceedings of the Human Factors Society 35th Annual Meeting, 
(pp. 107–111). Santa Monica, CA: Human Factors and Ergonomics Society. 
150
Mosier, K.L., Skitka, L.J., Heers, S. & Burdick, M. (1998). Automation Bias: Decision 
Making and Performance in High Tech Cockpits. The International Journal of Aviation 
Psychology, 8(1):47-63.  
NTSB, National Transportation Safety Board. 2009. Accident and Incident Report for Part 
121 Operators. [Online] Available from: http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/AVIATION/ 
[Downloaded: 2009-03-17]. Nunnally, J.C. & Bernstein, I.H. (1994). Psychometric 
Theory. (3rd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Palmer, E. (1995). Oops, "It Didn’t Arm." A Case Study of Two Automation Surprises. 
Proceedings of the Eighth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, (pp. 227-
232). Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. 
            Paolo, R. (2001). The Birth of Modern Science. London: Blackwell. 
Parasuraman, R., Molloy, R. & Singh, I. (1993). Performance Consequences of Automation 
Induced Complacency. The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 3(1), 1-23.  
Parasuraman, R. & Riley, V. (1997). Humans and Automation: Use, Misuse, Disuse, Abuse. 
The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 39(2):230-253. 
Risukhin, V. (2001). Controlling Pilot Error. Automation. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Rudisill, M. (1995). Line pilots’ attitudes about and experience with flight deck automation: 
Results of an international survey and proposed guidelines. Proceedings of the Eighth 
International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, (pp. 288-293), Columbus, OH: The 
Ohio State University. 
SACAA. 2007. [Statistics per licence on gender. XLS] According to C. Lakay, (e-mail 
communication, July 2007; LakayC@caa.co.za)  
Sarter, N.B. (1995). Knowing when to look where: Attention allocation on advanced 
automated flight decks. Proceedings of the Eighth International Symposium on Aviation 
Psychology, (pp.239-241). Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University. 
Sarter, N.B. (1996). Human errors are symptoms of a mismatch between pilots, machines, 
and the operating environment. ICAO Journal, 51(8), 9-10. 
Sarter, N.B., & Woods, D.D. (1992). Pilot interaction with cockpit automation: operational 
experiences with the flight management system. The International Journal of Aviation 
Psychology, 2 (4):303-321.  
Sarter, N. B. & Woods, D. D. (1994). Pilot interaction with cockpit automation II: An 
experimental study of pilots' mental model and awareness of the Flight Management System 
(FMS). The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 4(1), 1-28. 
Sarter, N.B., Woods, D. D. & Billings, C.E. (1997). Automation surprises.  In G. Salvendy 
(Ed.), Handbook of Human Factors & Ergonomics, (2nd ed.), (pp 1-25), New York: John 
Wiley.  
Schepers, J.M. (1992). Toetskonstruksie: Teorie en Praktyk. Johannesburg: RAU  
Singh, I., Deaton, J. & Parasuraman, R. (2001). Development of a Scale to Assess Pilot 
Attitudes Towards Cockpit Automation. Journal of the Indian Academy of Applied 
Psychology, 27(1-2), 205-211. 
Sherman, P.J. (1997). Aircrews’ Evaluations of Flight Deck Automation Training and Use: 
Measuring and Ameliorating Threats to Safety1. Technical Report 97-22. 
 FAA Grant 92-G-017.  
Sherman. P.J., Helmreich, R. L. & Merritt, A.C. (1997). National Culture and Flightdeck 
Automation: Results of a Multi-nation Survey. The International Journal of Aviation 
Psychology, 7(4), 311-329. 
151
 
Skitka, L.J., Mosier, K.L., Burdick, M. & Rosenblatt, B. (2000). Automation Bias and Errors: 
Are Crews Better than Individuals? The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 
10(1):85-97. 
Tabachnick, B.G. & Fidell, L.S. (2007). Using Multivariate Statistics, (5th ed.). Boston, MA: 
Allyn & Bacon. 
The Boeing Company. (2009). Message Number: MOM-MOM-09-0063-01B. 04-March-
2009. 
Wiener, E. L. (1988). Cockpit Automation. In E.L. Wiener & D.C. Nagel (Eds.), Human 
Factors in Aviation, (pp. 433-461). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Wiener, E. L. (1989). Human Factors of Advanced Technology (“Glass Cockpit”) Transport 
Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528, Moffett Field, CA, USA.  
Wiener, E. L. (1993). Crew Coordination and Training in the Advanced Cockpit. Cockpit 
Resource Management. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Wood ,S. (2004).  Flight Crew Reliance on Automation. CAA  Paper 2004/10.  
Research Management Department, Safety Regulation Group, Civil Aviation Authority, UK, 
Gatwick Airport South, West Sussex. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
152
